"We have learned nothing from Rwanda, " Kofi Annan on history's judgment of the international response to Darfur (BBC, July 3, 2005)
Eric Reeves
July 6, 2005
"Are we going to repeat what happened in Rwanda?" asked UN Secretary-General Annan in a recent BCC documentary (July 3, 2005). Annan posed the question again: "Is [Darfur] going to be another Rwanda?" Asked about how history "would judge the international response [to Darfur]," Annan said: "Quite likely that we were slow, hesitant, uncaring, and that we have learned nothing from Rwanda" (Reuters, July 3, 2005).
While such an honest assessment is surely welcome, its belatedness and expediency---coming only in the third year of ethnically-targeted human destruction in Darfur---must be noted as well. For this is not the first time Annan has invoked Darfur in the context of Rwanda. Precisely fifteen months ago, in marking the grim tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Annan (who was head of UN peacekeeping at the time of the Rwandan genocide) declared that the atrocities being reported in Darfur "leave me with a deep sense of foreboding" and, further, that "whatever the language we use" to describe atrocities in Darfur, "the international community cannot stand idle."
In fact, the international community has been largely idle in confronting those responsible for "atrocities in Darfur," and Annan must again bear a good deal of the responsibility. A significant new report today (July 6, 2005) from the International Crisis Group (see below) offers the most compelling account available of the need for a more robust international response in Darfur. And in arguing for humanitarian intervention that will almost certainly require NATO troops, the International Crisis Group demonstrates a courage and specificity that have eluded Annan for well over a year.
Here it is worth bearing in mind that on April 7, 2004 Annan explicitly spoke of humanitarian intervention in Darfur, and concluded his remarks on this terrible occasion by declaring that,
"wherever civilians are deliberately targeted because they belong to a particular community, we are in the presence of potential, if not actual, genocide." (UN News Center, Reuters, and other wire services, April 7, 2004)
And yet for over two months nothing followed from this extraordinary assessment. Indeed, the next consequential statement on Darfur made by Annan came on June 17, 2004:
"Based on reports that I have received, I cannot at this stage call [the human destruction and atrocities in Darfur] genocide. There are massive violations of international humanitarian law, but I am not ready to describe it as genocide or ethnic cleansing yet." (Voice of America, June 17, 2004)
But this subsequent judgment was perversely ill-informed or a deliberate and culpable obfuscation. Jan Egeland, the well-informed and forthright UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, had declared the targeted human destruction in Darfur to be "ethnic cleansing" over two months earlier (Reuters, April 4, 2004). Egeland again used the term "ethnic cleansing"---in describing a "scorched-earth campaign" in Darfur by Khartoum and its Janjaweed militia---on May 27, 2004 (Reuters, May 27, 2004).
MUKESH KAPILA AND DARFUR'S REALITIES IN EARLY 2004
Whatever Annan's motives, his comments of June 17, 2004 were clearly not informed by the professional assessments of Darfur offered by the former UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila:
"'The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved' [said Kapila]. '[The slaughter in Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is an organised attempt to do away with a group of people.'" (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 22, 2004)
"'I was present in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, and I've seen many other situations around the world and I am totally shocked at what is going on in Darfur [ ]. This is ethnic cleansing, this is the world's greatest humanitarian crisis, and I don't know why the world isn't doing more about it.'" (BBC, March 19, 2004)
"[Kapila] said the violence, which he described as 'ethnic cleansing', was mostly carried out by Arab militias known as Janjaweed who were supported by government forces. 'Under those circumstances one can only conclude that it is state-sanctioned.'" (Reuters [Khartoum], March 26, 2004)
"The pattern of organised attacks on civilians and villages, abductions, killings and organised rapes by militias was getting worse by the day, [Kapila] said, and could deteriorate even further. 'One can see how the situation might develop without prompt [action]...all the warning signs are there.'" (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 22, 2004)
These prescient words led to the only appropriate conclusion, though one Kofi Annan has refused to comprehend or expediently ignored for many months:
"War crimes tribunals must be held to try those responsible for raping, looting and killing in African villages in Sudan's western Darfur region, a senior UN official said, accusing the state of complicity. 'There are no secrets,' UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Mukesh Kapila said. 'The individuals who are doing this are known. We have their names. The individuals who are involved occupy senior positions.'" (Reuters [Khartoum], March 26, 2004)
Subsequently, Kapila has testified before Parliament in the UK about his efforts to convey to the British government and others what was a "form of genocide" (from Corrected transcript of Oral Evidence; to be published as HC 67-v; taken before the International Development Committee, House of Commons, February 22, 2005). Kapila offered in his testimony disturbing insight into the reasons for international failure to condemn genocide in Darfur, as well as the reason for Annan's June 17, 2004 "agnosticism." Kapila was asked pointedly by the Chair of the International Development Committee, Tony Baldry:
"[Baldry:] Did you have any suggestion from the UK Government that you should ease up your comments and your criticisms on Darfur until the Naivasha agreement was concluded?"
"[Mukesh Kapila:] Yes." (Q 201 from Corrected transcript of Oral Evidence; to be published as HC 67-v; taken before the International Development Committee, House of Commons, February 22, 2005)
The UK was far from alone in being willing to downplay genocide in Darfur in the interest of securing a "north/south" peace agreement (a crude diplomatic ploy readily perceived and relentlessly exploited by the Khartoum regime during negotiations, and subsequently).
OTHER VOICES ON GENOCIDE AND "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN DARFUR
But Kapila's was hardly a lone voice. Annan, in declaring that he had seen no "reports" that would lead him to a judgment of genocide or "ethnic cleansing [in Darfur]," was suggesting that he and his very substantial staff had not read reports by humanitarian organizations on the ground in Darfur, or by such distinguished international organizations as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group.
In particular, Annan and his staff chose to ignore the findings of a group of "concerned humanitarian workers in Darfur," who submitted on March 26, 2004 "A Briefing Paper on the Darfur Crisis: ethnic cleansing," a "[report] prepared by a group of concerned humanitarian workers in Darfur who requested the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator to bring this to the attention of the international community" (March 26, 2004). Among the findings of this briefing paper are:
"In order to increase its capacity to fight Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), the Government of Sudan has called for the support of a proxy force constituted by ethnic Arab fighters, the Janjaweed. Though the intention of Government of Sudan may initially not have been to target civilians, but potential SLA fighters, it is clear that today all Fur and Zaghawa villagers or town residents are systematically targeted. It seems to have become a military logic of the Government of Sudan that the only way to defeat the SLA is to remove the entire support base (villages where to hide, and villagers who could provide SLA cover and food)."
"Ethnic cleansing is characterized by a deliberate policy executed through clear command-and-control arrangements by which a group, based on its race, origin or religion, is forcibly removed from an area. The pattern witnessed in the Darfur region to forcibly remove non-Arab tribes (mainly Fur, Zaghawas, Messalites and Birgit) from their villages is consistent in all areas."
"[Arab nomads who make up the janjaweed] make it clear that the Government of Sudan has now given them a mandate to make these areas 'Zurga free' (Zurga is a derogatory term for Black) and that they represent the Government of Sudan in the area. Violence is systematically reported, people killed (especially males), goods including cattle looted, and houses burned. If people do not move immediately, a second more deadly attack is launched, and civilians are left with no option but to move away to the nearest 'safe haven,' which is usually also attacked within the next few days." ("A Briefing Paper on the Darfur Crisis: ethnic cleansing"; prepared by "a group of concerned humanitarian workers in Darfur who requested the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator to bring this to the attention of the international community" (March 26, 2004)
Human Rights Watch had also made abundantly clear the ethnic crimes that Annan professed not to be persuaded of:
"In this report, Human Rights Watch has documented a pattern of human rights violations in West Darfur that amount to a government policy of 'ethnic cleansing' of certain ethnic groups, namely the Fur and the Masalit, from their areas of residence [Human Rights Watch acknowledges in a footnote at this point: "While a similar pattern may be in effect in North Darfur, the Zaghawa homeland, the scope of this report is limited to West Darfur," footnote 114]. Other credible sources, in particular the Emergency Relief Coordinator of the UN system, and the former Resident Coordinator of the UN system in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, have made similar claims." ("Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by [the Sudan] Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan" (May 2004), page 39; available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/ )
Human Rights Watch offered in this authoritative report, based on extensive field research both along the Chad/Darfur border and in West Darfur itself, compelling evidence for all its claims. The documentation in this 75-page PDF file is extraordinarily detailed. Are we to believe that this is another report that Kofi Annan and his staff did not read or receive ("based on reports that I have received...")?
The International Crisis Group (Brussels) had also declared prior to Annan's June 17, 2004 agnostic pronouncement:
"A month after the international community solemnly marked the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in April 2004 with promises of 'never again,' it faces a man-made humanitarian catastrophe in western Sudan (Darfur) that can easily become nearly as deadly. It is too late to prevent substantial ethnic cleansing, but if the UN Security Council acts decisively--including by preparing to authorise the use of force as a last resort---there is just enough time to save hundreds of thousands of lives directly threatened by Sudanese troops and militias and by looming famine [ ]." ("Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur," May 23, 2004, page i; available at: http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2765&l=1 )
There are only two possible explanations for Annan's highly consequential declaration of agnosticism about genocide and "ethnic cleansing" in Darfur on June 17, 2004: ignorance or expediency. It is not clear which is more destructive in the context of Darfur. Certainly the "hundreds of thousands of lives directly threatened" in May of 2004 remain threatened in July 2005---and for many scores of thousands, the threat has already resulted in death.
The fact that Annan has shifted with such facility in his commentary on Darfur is important not only because he heads the most important world body, but because his substitution of commentary for action is mirrored throughout the international community. We will, for example, certainly hear pious and unctuous words of concern for Darfur expressed at the G-8 meeting currently underway in Scotland; there will be some reiteration of a willingness to assist logistically the African Union (AU) in its current woefully inadequate efforts to improve security in Darfur.
But we will hear nothing that marks a real commitment to ending what has become "genocide by attrition" in Darfur. As a new report today from the International Crisis Group (Nairobi/Brussels) makes clear, far more than words are necessary if meaningful security is to be brought to the more than 3 million civilians now affected by conflict in Darfur.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN DARFUR
The Overview to the new report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) offers some essential truths:
"The international community is failing in its responsibility to protect the inhabitants of Darfur, many of whom are still dying or face indefinite displacement from their homes. New thinking and bold action are urgently needed. The consensus to support a rough doubling of the African Union force to 7,731 troops by the end of September 2005 under the existing mandate is an inadequate response to the crisis. The mandate must be strengthened to prioritise civilian protection, and a force level of at least 12,000 to 15,000 is needed urgently now, not in nearly a year as currently envisaged. This requires more courageous thinking by the AU, NATO, the European Union, the UN and the US to get adequate force levels on the ground in Darfur with an appropriate civilian protection mandate as quickly as possible, which in practical terms means within the next two months." (The International Crisis Group [Nairobi/Brussels], "The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps," July 6, 2005; at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547 )
The findings and recommendations offered in this critically important report represent an honesty that has been sorely lacking in debate about the international response to Darfur. Its forthright assessment of AU shortcomings, the particular military requirements of the Darfur crisis, and the attendant political issues---all mark this report as of far more importance than belated and self-exculpatory maundering by the UN Secretary-General.
The ICG report is direct and emphatic in its assessment of the Khartoum regime:
"The assumption that the Sudanese government will fulfill its responsibilities and continued reliance on its cooperation as a pre-requisite for action against the militias with which it is allied, are egregious self-deceptions. Khartoum's interest in seeking a lasting solution to the conflict is disingenuous, and it has systematically flouted numerous commitments to rein in its proxy militias---collectively known as the Janjaweed. It has consistently opted for cosmetic efforts aimed at appeasing international pressure, minimised the political dimensions of the conflict, and inflamed ethnic divisions to achieve military objectives." (Overview, page 1)
The ICG report is equally unsparing of international acceptance of the AU as the only response necessary in responding to this vast crisis:
"Equally flawed is the concept that the atrocities are African-only problems that require African-only solutions. The well-documented abuses that continue to occur demand broader and more robust international efforts aimed at enhancing the AU's ability to lead. In view of the Sudanese government's abdication of its sovereign duty and to the extent that the AU cannot adequately protect Sudan's civilians, the broader international community has a responsibility to do so. Civilian protection needs to become the primary objective." (Overview, page 1)
The essential military requirement is to "recognize that more troops are needed":
"[A force of] 12,000-15,000 should, in Crisis Group's estimate, be on the ground now to protect villages against further attack or destruction, displaced persons against forced repatriation and intimidation, and women from systematic rape outside the camps, as well as to provide security for humanitarian operations, and neutralise the government-supported militias that prey on civilians."
Recognizing how unlikely it is that the AU can deploy a force of appropriate size---with sufficient training, equipment, and "inter-operability"---ICG recommends the development of a "Bridging Force Option":
"If the AU cannot meet these objectives---numbers and quality of troops, and time [60 days]---NATO should work closely with the AU to deploy its own bridging force and bring the total force up to 12,000 to 15,000 within 60 days and maintain it at that level until the AU can perform the mission entirely with its own personnel. The AU should agree that until such time, its units would come under command and control of the NATO mission. The UN Security Council should authorise the mission with a civilian protection mandate but if it does not, the AU and NATO would need to assume the responsibility and agree on an appropriate mandate." (Overview, page 2)
And the ICG, alone among all major international organizations, accepts the full military logic that emerges from the catastrophic threat to human life and livelihood in Darfur:
"If the Sudanese government does not accept such a mission, NATO and the AU would need to prepare a much larger one to operate in a nonpermissive environment." (Overview, page 2)
As the ICG rightly insists, the issue of mandate is central:
"The AU must strengthen AMIS's [AU Mission in Sudan's] mandate to enable and encourage it to undertake all necessary measures, including offensive action, against any attacks or threats to civilians and humanitarian operations, whether from militias operating with the government or from the rebels. Without a stronger mandate, the ability of AMIS---or any other international force---to provide protection will remain extremely limited, regardless of its size."
For those who would argue that the military situation is being defused by present AU efforts, the ICG report offers a sobering and realistic assessment:
"Both sides [the Khartoum regime and the Darfur insurgency movements] have sent public and private signals that they are restraining their forces to improve the chances for peace. From the government side, Vice President Ali Osman Taha has arranged high-level tribal reconciliation conferences in Khartoum and Tripoli, as well as Darfur, during the last two months. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that any of this indicates a genuine change of strategy by the parties. It is a reaction to mounting international pressure. Khartoum seeks to dilute the impact of UN Security Council Resolutions 1591 and 1593. Its commitments do not run deep, as evidenced by its superficial implementation of measures adopted at the tribal reconciliation conferences." (Overview, page 2)
The insurgents continue to splinter, the ICG report notes, "making the quest for a political solution ever more elusive and contributing to a worsening security crisis in Darfur." Moreover, "both sides are using the [present] lull [in military actions] to rearm and reposition forces, indicating serious new fighting is a distinct possibility." And because Khartoum "still supports and protects the [Janjaweed] militias---responsible for more than 75 percent of all verified killings in Darfur since the AU Ceasefire Commission started work in June 2004---the relative battlefield lull has not improved civilian security" (Overview, page 4).
The answer to insecurity is to disarm the Janjaweed, which the UN Security Council has "demanded" of Khartoum, and which the regime has "promised" in five different separate agreements (see footnote 11, page 3 of ICG Overview):
"The best way to provide security [for civilians and humanitarian operations] would be prudent but deliberate application of force against those directly responsible for the insecurity and atrocities." (Report, page 9)
This would entail some actions against the insurgency movements, but overwhelmingly against Khartoum's military proxy, the Janjaweed. The ICG report certainly recognizes the likely political resistance from Khartoum, but rightly notes that the regime's argument has been "that it is not in full control of the Janjaweed" (page 9). "Above all, the continuation of serious violence [that Khartoum] has repeatedly pledged to stop [is] sufficient justification" for humanitarian intervention.
And again the hard but essential truth about such intervention in Darfur:
"International insistence [on the deployment of appropriate military force, including NATO troops as necessary] should be backed by a decision to begin planning for the deployment, should this become necessary, of a fully mandated protection force in a non-permissive environment." (page 9)
Assessing operations in a permissive environment, ICG estimates that a minimum of 12,000-15,000 well-trained, well-equipped, and well-supplied military personnel are necessary (N.B.: a number of military assessments run to considerably greater force sizes):
"Based on its independent consultations with AU, UN and other military experts, Crisis Group considers that 12,000 to 15,000 is a more realistic figure [than AU estimates] for what is required to implement adequately the first priority and more demanding task of civilian protection in what is still by no means a fully permissive environment. A force thus sized, trained, and equipped is needed as quickly as it can be put in place---still in 2005---in order to protect villages and humanitarian operations against attack; IDPs against forced repatriation and intimidation; and women from systematic rape outside the camps; as well as to neutralise the Janjaweed militias. This minimum force level would involve something like eight battalion groups (infantry plus support elements, one for each sector), with a battalion as force reserve, in addition to 700 to 1,000 military observers, 1,500 to 2,000 civilian police, and 1,000 headquarters, support and other staff." (pages 9-10)
Time in Darfur is of the essence, and ICG declares its belief that "the need is too urgent to allow so much time [as required for current AU deployment] to pass before the international force is strong enough to do the job that has to be done" (page 10).
Finally, ICG details the importance of "preventing offensive military flights" by the Khartoum regime. Though the regime has very recently shown "restraint in use of its military aircraft," "given its history of violating agreements, [Khartoum] is highly likely to resume operations should this suit its purposes" (page 13):
"The Security Council has not enacted an enforceable no-fly zone over Darfur, nor was the issue mentioned in either the AU Commissioner's recent report or the AU Peace and Security Commission's subsequent communiqu?. The notion of enforcement is caught between the contradictions of international reliance on Khartoum's cooperation and Khartoum's responsibility for the situation. Another factor is the AU's lack of capacity to monitor fully let alone enforce such a zone. Several enforcement options exist, however, ranging from persuading the government to cease all military flights in Darfur and remove its remaining air assets, including attack helicopters, from the area, to direct military action to disable or destroy any aircraft that violate the ban. The most widely favoured option by advocates is for the UN to establish a complete 'no-fly zone' and for the international force thereafter to deny the airspace. However, this would be expensive and require significant air assets, command and control, and logistics." (page 13)
The conclusion of the ICG report has become inescapable:
"Disturbingly, the daily death and suffering is already becoming 'status quo' for some relief agencies, and the situation has the potential to become another never-ending 'low intensity' conflict in which the international community spends large sums each year keeping IDPs and refugees alive but otherwise fails to protect civilians and to address the underlying political causes." (Conclusion, page 14)
Unless the international community is willing to confront the compelling logic of the ICG assessment, it will simply reveal its willing complicity in the genocidal status quo. There can be no morally acceptable deferral of judgment about this extraordinarily timely report.
HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN DARFUR
The recent mortality rate survey conducted by the UN suggests that the current mortality rate in Darfur is under the "emergency" threshold (see June 30, 2005 analysis by this writer at http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid =58&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 ). But this still implies, given the staggering number of "conflict-affected persons," a monthly mortality total of over 6,000 human beings---a number poised to grow rapidly in the current rainy season. As the UN World Health Organization representative in Sudan notes:
"'The combination of crowded conditions in the settlements, shortage of clean water, inadequate latrines, insufficient soap, and the mire caused by rain-soaked mud mingling with excreta, have combined to make hygiene an impossible goal for people living in small, tarpaulin-covered huts, and these conditions need to be solved,' said Guido Sabatinelli, the WHO Representative in Sudan." (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 6, 2005)
But the rainy season will only make increasing the humanitarian supply of clean water, adequate sanitary facilities, shelter, and other critical "non-food items" all the more difficult. Explosive mortality from cholera and dysentery is again possible. Deaths from malaria are also poised to increase very significantly with the first hatches of mosquitoes.
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the current mortality rate is not evenly distributed within Darfur, nor adequately captured in the UN mortality rate survey. Kalma camp in South Darfur, the largest of all the camps for displaced persons, has a mortality rate for children-under-five that is well above the emergency threshold for this most vulnerable group. And as Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the largest humanitarian presence in Darfur, notes:
"'One of our concerns is that, due to ongoing insecurity, there is potentially a risk of bias [in the mortality rate assessment], as the UN has no access to where the war is,' Paul Foreman, head of mission of the Dutch branch of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) said on Tuesday. 'Overall figures may diminish the fact that there are pockets of extreme suffering, many times the emergency threshold.'" (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 6, 2005)
Insecurity also continues to threaten countless lives in Darfur, sometimes in terrifying new ways. Thus Kofi Annan, in his most recent (June 2005) report to the UN Security Council (pursuant to Security Council resolution 1556), notes "a particularly disturbing series of reports [that] has highlighted the selection [by the Janjaweed militiamen] of the youngest in a group of women for sexual attack" (Section III, paragraph 16).
The most recent "fact sheet" on the Darfur crisis from the US Agency for International Development (July 1, 2005) reports on a security threat that has persisted for over a year, viz., the forced re-location of already displaced persons:
"The International Organization for Migration [Geneva] has indicated that not all organized return cases [from Darfur displacement camps] are being reported to IOM by the Sudanese [i.e., Khartoum's] Committee for Voluntary Return and many of them are reported with insufficient time for IOM to determine if the returns are voluntary and appropriate. IOM also noted that it continues to receive information [from the Khartoum government] about returns that is not credible or cannot be verified."
The clear implication is that these returns are in many cases involuntary, and part of Khartoum's long-established deportation policy as a response to the crisis created by roughly 2.5 million displaced persons (not including approximately 200,000 refugees in Chad). Without a much more robust humanitarian intervention, this brutal policy will continue unchecked.
THE GENOCIDAL STATUS QUO
Peace talks in Abuja (Nigeria) have ended without progress beyond the signing of a vague document purporting to spell out a "declaration of principles." For those inclined to see hope in this painfully modest achievement, it should be recalled that is was eight years between the time that Khartoum's National Islamic Front regime agreed to a "declaration of principles" for southern Sudan (1997) and the culmination of negotiations in a formal agreement on January 9th of this year. There were no specific agreements in Abuja, only hopelessly general principles such as:
"'upholding democracy,' [ ] 'justice and equality for all, regardless of ethnicity, religion and gender,' [ ] 'an effective devolution of powers' to regional authorities[,] 'Darfur's people should be ensured of a role in all levels of government.'" (Associated Press, July 5, 2005)
Fine principles in the abstract, but in Khartoum's eyes utterly unconstraining as diplomatic terms of reference. All the difficult work has been put off until the next negotiating session (the last was in December 2004). And even this acrimonious session may have achieved less than is suggested by ebullient newswire headlines. A spokesman for the smaller of the two insurgency groups (the Justice and Equality Movement) has declared that "his group was disappointed with the document [and] that it had only signed up under pressure from the African Union and the broader international community" (Agence France-Presse [Abuja], July 5, 2005).
There is no realistic prospect of meaningful diplomatic progress in the near term, political agreements that will actually diminish the threat to human security in Darfur. Humanitarian intervention remains, as it has for over a year and a half, the only response that can avert the deaths of scores of thousands of additional civilian lives. That as many as 200,000 lives have already been lost during this period of urgent and obvious need is one of the most shameful measures of our failure to date in Darfur.
Unless a proposal for intervention of the sort courageously and compellingly articulated by the International Crisis Group commands serious attention from world leaders, we may be sure that there will be terrible additions to the more than 360,000 who have already perished in Darfur (see June 30, 2005 mortality assessment by this writer; URL above). Mournful words from Kofi Annan will be of no help; nor will the sententious declarations sure to issue from the G-8 gathering in Scotland. Either NATO commits, with broad-based political support, to stopping genocide in Darfur, or genocide will continue. Mere words cannot make it otherwise.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
http://www.sudanreeves.org